This article first appeared as an opinion piece in the Australian Financial Review

We will learn a great deal about Australia’s new monetary policy board this week. 

After all the hoopla generated by last week’s high inflation numbers, the RBA must make it clear to the Australian community what this could mean for interest rates.

No ‘on the one hand….. but on the other’ will cut the mustard. No talk of higher than usual uncertainty. 

The RBA Governor needs to do what she does best. She needs to be straight with the Australian people. 

The Governor needs to say it as it is: in the absence of a significant shift in the trajectory of the economy over the next six months we will most likely need to raise the cash rate in 2026.

It Is well understood that clear communications are a powerful monetary policy tool. 

The RBA’s communications strategy should be solely focused on economic objectives. Leave the political massaging for conversations behind closed doors.

A strong signal of intent from the RBA leadership is our best chance of avoiding a nasty tightening cycle in the not-too-distant future.

This time round the RBA cannot rely on others to ring the bell. After the discomfort of a drawn-out federal election campaign, the RBA must take charge if they hope to have any real impact on the economy.

The political backdrop remains fraught, but the RBA cannot afford to tippy toe any longer. We have seen what ambiguity brings; the narrative is controlled by those with a very different set of objectives to our monetary policy makers.

If the RBA are put back in their box on enough occasions; people will stop listening.

Natural disasters, geopolitical conflict or a major financial correction are all events that could alter the monetary policy calculations at any time. But as it stands, the outlook is much clearer than many would like to believe. 

The macroeconomic basics are clear. We are one year into a recovery from a mid-cycle slowdown. We have little spare capacity in the economy. Inflation has not returned to target in a sustainable way, and it now looks like inflation will rise into 2026.

What we really learnt last week is that a 3.6% cash rate is not restrictive. Most of the bad outcomes in our economy are the result of structural forces, not high interest rates.

To pretend otherwise is dangerous.

The RBA’s monetary policy board is facing a pivotal few days.  Last Wednesday’s quarterly inflation numbers were nothing short of shocking for those thinking that inflation is drifting down to the midpoint of the RBA’s 2% to 3% target band. 

Most economists are in some form of shock; some may have progressed to the second stage of the extended Kubler-Ross model of grief, denial. The impact and significance of the September quarter inflation report on economic forecasters cannot be underestimated.

The world is being transformed by non-economic factors. A transformation that is gradual, persistent and unstoppable. These new realities are easily misunderstood, by even the most rigorous intellect, and take years to be accepted as the new normal in the broader community.

But it is only when the forecasting community can move to the critical penultimate stage, acceptance, that the final processing stage can begin.

For those still in denial, there will be concerted efforts to play down what is a basic fact. Australia never got inflation under control, preferring propaganda and hope over dispassionate reality. 

The RBA can, indeed must, play an important role in reshaping expectations this week. It starts with the professional forecasting community and the media. As this gain’s traction, this new consensus will make its way through the public consciousness.

The RBA have been somewhat tentative with their views and communications this year. The structural changes reshaping our economy are impacting their confidence in economic assessment as much as anyone. 

The September quarter inflation report confirmed my worst fears. A much bigger headline CPI than anyone thought. Core inflation topping the expectations of all but a few of us.

Core inflation rose just 0.7% in the June quarter, jumping to 1% in September. This likely overstates the extent of the of the turnaround in underlying inflation pressures but it does not change the veracity of the latest reading. 

What really marks the latest inflation numbers is the breadth of inflation pressures. None of the eleven major components of the CPI fell in the quarter, the first time this has happened since 2022. Annual core inflation rose for the first time since, you guessed it, 2022.

The Headline CPI is on track to hit 4% in the next six months. The unwinding of government subsidies will be a factor. Abstracting from this, core inflation looks set to print around 3.5% at some stage in 2026.

The bottom line is that the September quarter inflation report is a wake-up call; a signal that inflation is on the rise again. This should not be a surprise, coming about nine months after the domestic economic cycle turned for the better. Some fundamentals still work.

One fact remains rock solid. An economy experiencing strong labour demand and widespread labour shortages will continue to see upward pressure on business costs. Businesses will either fail; or inflation will rise.

The biggest business cost is labour, and although national wages are growing at 3.5%, our abysmal productivity performance means unit labour costs, which is what matters for inflation, are rising well above the RBA’s 2.5% inflation target.

There is every chance productivity may improve a little in 2026; but there is just as much chance that wages growth accelerates from here, rather than the widespread expectation of a further decline. 

One of the more concerning features of the last few months is that consumer inflation expectations are on the rise once again. An uncomfortable fact, and a very real threat to the RBA’s inflation mandate.

Key Points

The RBA has left the cash rate at 3.6%. The headlines will say ‘as expected’ but we only need to go back a few weeks when markets were pricing a greater than 50% chance of a rate cut today. The AFR survey of economist from a month ago showed only a third of the 30+ economist surveyed thoughts rates would stay at 3.6% this year and less than 15% of economists were forecasting rates to be stable at 3.6% by June next year.

The decision to hold rates steady is a genuine shock for many economists who are now shifting their view towards stable interest rates.

The big story from the RBA meeting today is the big change to their economic forecasts since they last reported back in August. The changes have been forced upon them by the reality of stronger than expected consumer spending and the high inflation result for the September quarter.

Looking a little more closely at the RBA forecast numbers reveals that they have only changed their short-term forecasts to reflect what has happened in the last three months. They still have the economy stuck at 2% growth, and the RBA is still forecasting inflation to come back into the target band in FY27. The RBA projections have very weak business investment pencilled in for the next 2 years.

The bottom line: the spirit of their projections out to 2027 have not really changed despite mounting evidence of an economic recovery in 2025. They had no choice. Any further upward revision to inflation would be a trigger for higher interest rates. They are tippy toeing away from rate cuts; but not prepared to make the big step toward rate hikes just yet. The problem for the RBA is that they will be forced into further revisions over the months ahead if the economic data continue surprise to the high side.

I expect the cash rate to stay at 3.6% for some time yet. 

Recent data increase the likelihood that the next rate move will be up.We have pencilled in a new rate-hiking cycle for late 2026, but we could see the first hike come as early as May if the recent strength in economic activity and higher inflation results persist over the summer months. At this stage, the RBA is hesitant to commit to a hawkish stance in the absence of a clear trend in the inflation data.

A rate cut remains a possibility, particularly if risk factors come into play, the economy slows, and inflation appears to be heading back toward target. In the weeks ahead, the monthly inflation numbers, consumer sentiment, and employment data will be important in determining how the critical retail period from late November through early January goes. This will have a big influence on the likely trajectory for the economy and interest rates in early 2026. 

First Published as Australian Financial Review Opinion Article on 26 October 2025

The RBA’s monetary policy board is facing a pivotal fortnight, marked by a quarterly CPI report that is likely to show inflation back above the 2% to 3% target range, complicated by a surprise jump up in the unemployment rate in September a few weeks ago.

This week’s quarterly Consumer Price Index (CPI) outcome is likely to reshape the monetary policy debate away from rate cuts, and provide a timely reminder to both markets and policymakers that Australia’s inflation problem is far from resolved.

Economists anticipate a 1.1% quarterly rise in the Consumer Price Index (CPI), which would lift the annual rate from 2.1% in June to 3% in September. Core inflation is projected to climb by 0.8% for the quarter, pushing the annual core rate from 2.6% to 2.8%.

Some forecasters are expecting a higher outcome. Following high monthly inflation results in July and August, there is a genuine risk that the ABS Trimmed Mean measure could be 1% in Q3. This would take both headline and core inflation above the RBA’s target band, confirming that the disinflation process of the last 2 years has run its course.

If the CPI comes in as expected on Wednesday, it will confirm that inflation is outpacing the RBA’s expectations from August. Coupled with stronger than expected domestic spending data in recent months, quarterly inflation of 1% makes it very hard for the RBA to maintain their inflation forecast at the midpoint of its 2% to 3% target band.

Financial markets do not seem to be cognisant of these policy risks having reacted swiftly to the rise in the unemployment rate. Interest rate markets cranked up expectations of a November rate cut. One commentator called for a 50bp rate cut on Melbourne Cup Day; apparently worried the economy was on the verge of a slump.

The RBA faces a difficult situation, with markets perceiving it as more responsive to rising unemployment than committed to containing inflation. This perception threatens the RBA’s inflation-fighting credibility. If that credibility erodes, the bank may be forced into a more aggressive policy tightening cycle than otherwise should inflation rear its ugly head in 2026.

To manage these risk, a demonstration of inflation fighting resolve may be necessary from the RBA Governor next week, reinforced by the market’s strong reaction to the rise in the unemployment rate. The unemployment rate increased from 4.2% in August to 4.5% in September, surpassing the RBA’s 4.3% unemployment rate forecast for December 2025.

It is well understood that the monthly labour force report is volatile, with considerable potential for ‘noise’ in any given month. While the data confirms an upward drift in unemployment in 2025, the magnitude of the September rise may not accurately reflect Australia’s economic realities.

At the very least, it is prudent to for the RBA economists to await the next monthly employment report before drawing firm conclusions about the direction of the Australian labour market.

Putting statistical issues to the side, there are economic reasons to exercise caution in overinterpreting the recent rise in the unemployment rate. The rise in unemployment does not necessarily indicate weak demand for labour; rather, it reflects a mismatch between the skills that Australian workers possess, and those that employers require.

The RBA is unable to address this form of unemployment through monetary policy, and any attempt to do so risks fuelling inflation and introducing instability into the economy.

If Australia is experiencing a structural shift in the demand for skills, estimates of full employment could rise. The Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU), which is thought to be somewhere between 4% and 4.5%, could temporarily move higher, possibly towards 5%.

Whatever uncertainties cloud the labour market, it looks like a done deal that inflation will exceed the RBA’s August forecasts. The revision to the RBA’s inflation forecast for December 2025 could be as much as 50bp.

So why the strong reaction to the unemployment numbers from the financial markets?

It appears that that the markets and various commentators believe the monetary policy board is more sensitive to rising unemployment than it is serious about price stability. I do not believe that the RBA leadership thinks in this way.

The Governor has stated on several occasions that the best way to ensure full employment is to maintain price stability. That is, inflation takes priority in the short-term.

The RBA Governor may need to demonstrate her inflation-fighting resolve should Wednesday’s inflation report surprise to the upside.

A mere pause on rate cuts and vague commentary will not suffice if this week’s CPI data highlights a risk that inflation could climb higher in 2026.

The Governor must make it clear that the policy debate isn’t just about whether they cut rates or not. She needs to highlight that the next move in policy could be in either direction. At the very least the RBA needs to playdown expectations of further rate cuts.

Australia is heavily exposed to inflation.

Australia’s household sector is among the most indebted in the world, with most of that debt held at floating interest rates. This leaves little room for error in managing inflation.

It is the RBA’s monetary policy board that is responsible for managing inflation risks. To let inflation become embedded within our economy will expose our community to substantial and unacceptable financial risks.

There is a genuine risk that inflation could begin to rise again. This would suggest the decline in measured inflation over the past two years has only been a cyclical pause, rather than a return to the sustained price stability that characterised nearly thirty years before the pandemic.

This week’s quarterly Consumer Price Index (CPI) outcome serves as a timely warning for both markets and policymakers, highlighting that Australia’s inflation issue is far from resolved. Inflation has ceased its downward trend and now appears to be heady back above the Reserve Bank of Australia’s (RBA) 2–3 percent target range.

In truth, these results could underscore the significant risk that inflation may be on the rise again. As government energy subsidies unwind over the months ahead, headline inflation could rise to 4%.

This would indicate that the recent reduction in measured inflation over the past two years is a temporary pause in the inflation process as opposed to a restoration of price stability in the Australian economy (inflation under 3%).

Australia’s Vulnerability to Inflation

Australia’s household sector is among the most indebted in the world, with the majority of that debt held at floating interest rates. This precarious situation leaves little margin for error in the management of inflation. If inflation is allowed to accelerate, there is a real danger of a surge in interest rates, which could inflict serious harm on the financial health of households, governments, and financial institutions. The result would almost certainly be a recession—potentially escalating into a full-blown financial crisis. This would not be ‘the recession Australia had to have’, but ‘the recession that could have been avoided’.

The absence of strong economic leadership is evident, with a persistent focus on short-term political considerations taking precedence over long-term economic stability. Our professional economic policymakers have not stood up to the challenge, often failing to push back on those driven by fear and self-interest, which further undermines Australia’s policy environment.

The Phillips Curve: A Classic Tension

These events spotlight the longstanding macroeconomic challenge of balancing inflation and unemployment, often conceptualised as the Phillips curve. This is embodied in the RBA’s ‘dual Mandate’ to keep inflation low and stable while maximising employment.

This tension is not merely technical; it embodies a broader ideological debate. On one side, progressive voices emphasise the importance of employment, advocating for policies that prioritise job creation and protection. On the other, conservative perspectives stress the need to contain inflation, highlighting its risks to economic stability and purchasing power.

Decision Time for the RBA

Ultimately, the Reserve Bank of Australia could face some tough decisions over the year ahead.

The RBA now faces a difficult situation, with markets perceiving it as more responsive to rising unemployment than committed to containing inflation. This perception threatens the RBA’s inflation-fighting credibility. If that credibility erodes, the bank may be forced to implement more rate hikes than otherwise to address any resurgence of inflation.

Such a demonstration of resolve may be necessary from the RBA Governor in the coming week, given the market’s strong reaction to the recent and unexpected rise in the unemployment rate for September, as reported by the ABS.

The unemployment rate increased from 4.2% in August to 4.5% in September, surpassing the RBA’s forecast for the rate to remain at 4.3% over the coming year.

However, it is well understood that the monthly labour force report is volatile, with considerable potential for ‘noise’ in any given month. While the data confirms an upward drift in unemployment during 2025, the magnitude of the September rise may not accurately reflect the actual trends.

Therefore, it is prudent to await the next monthly employment report before drawing firm conclusions about the direction of the Australian labour market. The October report, to be released a few weeks but after the next RBA monetary policy board meeting, will be particularly significant.

Sound practice dictates that the RBA should reserve judgement until this further data is available.

There are both statistical and economic reasons to exercise caution in overinterpreting the recent unemployment numbers. The current rise in unemployment does not necessarily indicate weak demand for labour; rather, it reflects a mismatch between the skills that Australian workers possess and those that employers require.

Geographic immobility may also play a role, with new jobs being created in areas where unemployed workers are not present. This type of unemployment is structural in nature, not a symptom of weak aggregate demand. The RBA is unable to address this form of unemployment through monetary policy, and any attempt to do so risks fuelling inflation and introducing instability into the economy.

If Australia is indeed experiencing a structural shift in the demand for skills and their geographic distribution, the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU), will rise. For example, if the NAIRU was previously estimated at 4%, it could temporarily move higher, possibly towards 5%.

Political realities complicate the situation further. Explaining such structural shifts and the implications for full employment to politicians focused on re-election and maintaining strong tax revenue is a significant challenge and can lead to pressure on the RBA’s leadership.

The RBA Governor will need to firmly demonstrate inflation-fighting resolve.

medium to long term.

Historical Context and Lessons

Australia is entering a risky new phase in efforts to restore price stability, reminiscent of the mid-1970s. Then, an initial cyclical reprieve in inflation gave way to another destructive price surge. While modern experience with inflation in Australia is limited, eradicating entrenched inflation generally requires at least one recession—sometimes two, as seen in the United States under Paul Volcker, who restored price stability through recessions in 1979 and 1982. In Australia, a severe downturn in the early 1980s failed to fully eliminate inflation, which persisted until the financial crisis of 1991, resulting in accelerated structural change and lasting impacts on the labour market.

It is preferable to endure a period of subpar growth driven by industrial structural change than to suffer through repeated severe downturns, which can erode risk appetite, damage expectations, and diminish the credibility of Australian policymakers for years to come.

Conclusion

The RBA’s credibility remains fragile, both among financial markets and the broader community. It is crucial not to overinterpret recent unemployment figures while underestimating the persistence and risks of inflation.

The Treasurer is looking for consensus on how to solve our productivity problem from a group of economic leaders. That is admirable but I think they first they must come to a common understanding of the problem itself, before moving into ‘solution’ mode. Productivity is not the problem; it is a symptom of the underlying problem.

The Productivity Commission (PC) in its recently released interim report outlined the broad drivers of productivity growth:

“Productivity growth can come about through several channels: 

Not all channels are created equal”

I think that these broad buckets are correct, but the issue is how to assess each of these in terms of what is happening in Australia in 2025 and over the decade ahead. Why are we not getting enough ‘capital deepening’? What is holding back the development and deployment of our human capital? Why are labour and capital resources not being efficiently allocated? And the big one; how do we encourage the adoption of incredible new digital capabilities to drive higher output per worker (i.e. productivity)?

Rather than jump into solution mode with tax proposals, regulatory reform suggestions and other policy changes; the time would be best spent on driving a consensus about what is happening in the economy to not only hinder productivity improvement, but more recently cause an unprecedented decline in our economies productivity level

Why are the four economic processes identified by the PC not delivering the productivity growth we once had. Indeed, what is happening to drive productivity down by more than 5% over the last three years?

Bottom Line: we must solve for the right problem.  Once we have a consensus on the problem, finding workable solutions will be much easier, and of course, the solutions will have a much better chance of success.

Without meaningful reform, where is the economy headed over the next two decades?

Most longer-term projections are a bit ‘wishy-washy’. And the analytics underpinning many projections are subject to the same issue of ‘problem’ identification. There are a whole range of views, many of them come from the perspective of a particular interest group, some assessments are unhelpful.

I think the best assessment of the problem came from the RBA in their latest set of economic forecasts. These forecasts cover the next 3 years (to 2027) which isn’t the time horizon that fundamental economic reform can have much impact on. The RBA Governor said as much. Fundamental and effective reform will be aimed at the medium to long term performance of the economy. But this should not be a reason for complacency. We are already experiencing a productivity slump; a crisis of economic performance. Implementation lead times mean that there is a real urgency about the reform task.

The August 2025 projections from the RBA depict an economy devoid of dynamism. Business investment hardly grows over the next few years, consumer spending is soft by historical standards, and the main driver of overall economic growth is government spending. The RBA revised down their productivity projection to a still optimistic 0.7% a year and even then we see little growth in real wages and living standards. 

The message I take from the RBA’s latest forecasts, coming right before the Roundtable, is:

“If we as a nation do not start addressing our productivity performance, then this 2 year economic outlook is what we should expect to see from the Australian economy over the long term”. 

Quite the wake-up call. 

The most important element of the RBA forecast is how weak business investment is projected to be. Little investment in technology; little capital deepening and hence little improvement in worker productivity. There is more to it that just business investment. The real problem we face is a less efficient allocation of our increasingly scare labour resources. We are not ensuring that our people, our workers are being set to the most productive tasks in the economy. 

This is partly a result of skills mismatches in a changing world, partly the result of government taking a much bigger role in the allocation of labour resources through the massive expansion of funding (spending) into the care economy. It is also a problem of labour market flexibility. Our people cannot move jobs easily. We have seen job mobility in Australia decline to record lows in 2025 to be one of the lowest of the advanced economies.

The last time we saw broad ranging economic reform was in the 1980/90s with a range of stakeholders working together to change the economy in fundamental ways. What do you think can be credited for its success? 

The wave of reform from the 1980s fundamentally changed the Australian economy, opening it up to the world (embracing free trade) and allowing the price mechanism (flexible markets) to take a greater role in determining how the economy allocated resources.

The changes to our economy did not come without costs and disruption to our communities.

These reforms came after a decade of reviews and reports that focused in on the core problem – an over regulated and protected economy. Throughout the 1970s the issue of poor economic performance was clear (high unemployment, high inflation and weak productivity growth). By the mid-1980s the core problem was widely understood – we needed a more market orientated economy to drive resource allocation rather than government regulation. A consensus emerged. 

Once the problem was understood the debate became about the best solutions (policy changes) to get us there. When the problem is known, all interested parties can come to the table and have a constructive debate.

These reforms, particularly the first wave in the 1980s, came with real short-term costs to our economy and it would be ludicrous to suggest mistakes were not made. But the result was one of the best complex industrial economies the world has ever seen. 

Australia became the ‘miracle economy’. We initiated a productivity boom that made us one of the wealthiest economies in the world, one that raised the living standards of all Australians. We also created an adaptable and flexible economy that was able to navigate shock after shock from the Asian financial crisis of 1997, to the ‘Tech Wreck’ of 2001, the GFC and the European debt crisis. We executed one of the biggest resource investments in human history without a boom-bust recession. 

We got lucky on many fronts. But the catalyst was leadership and vision, and the use of good economics to underpin the reform agenda.

There were short-term costs to be sure, but the benefits derived to all Australians massively outweighed these costs. And we can learn from the mistakes of the 1980s and 1990s this time. How to support people through difficult transitions and changed circumstances.

There has been a shift in our labour force in the past decade with the retirement of the ‘Baby Boomer’ generation. 

The demographic shift is at the core of our economic problem and although we can’t change these demographic realities all that much, we must accept that the economic landscape is shifting. As a community, and within our economic leadership, we are yet to fully understand just how profound these demographic changes are to the underlying functioning of our economy.

What does the big shift in our demographic structure mean for our economy? 

From the early 1970s until about 2010 we had the baby boomer generation entering the world force in increasing numbers. The traditional working age share of the population was increasing every year. Total population is a broad measure of demand in the economy while the working age population is a broad measure of the supply capacity of the economy, that is, the people who are available to work to supply the goods and services that the overall population needs. These are broad assessments, and other factors play a role, but it is the main game and most importantly, demographic trends are persistent – they are not going away.

To be clear – from 1970s to 2010 each year we had more working age population coming into the economy than the increase in population/demand. It was a period of labour abundance were finding jobs for everyone was the big challenge.  Unemployment was a major economic problem to be solved.

We have now shifted 180 degrees and each year we are seeing less and less working age population (supply) compared to population (demand) – and hence we are now in an era of labour scarcity – unemployment is no longer a macroeconomic issue – the real focus is microeconomic: how to get our scare labour supply, the workers of Australia, into the most productive jobs. We are already seeing this in our economy (job vacancies for example are well above the long-term trend and the ratio to the number of unemployed is at extremes (since the survey commenced in 1979).

While it is credit to our government that they have been producing the Inter-Generational Report (IGR) for the past 25 years in an attempt to address these big changes; the problem is they have missed the point on how these demographic changes are altering the underlying functioning of the economy. The focus has been on the impact of rising old age dependency on the government’s budget and the impact of a slowing relative workforce growth on income tax revenues.

A cynical interpretation of the IGR process is that it has been a ‘trojan horse’ for big government. An excuse to break with three decades of government financial discipline and start throwing taxpayer money around like confetti.

What has Australia been doing to address the demographic shift?

The main thing we have been doing is increasing government spending, and taxation, with the last three years showcasing this process in the federal governments care economy strategy.

Out there on main street, the way we have been coping with labour shortages is by dragging people into the workforce and taking our participation rate (those in labour force) to record high levels. Mainly through increasing how many people aged over 65 years old that are actively participating in work. Whether this is a good or bad thing is not the issue, the issue is how far can we push our population to work, particularly in older age. Eventually this will reach a limit but the demographic trend will remain in place well into the middle of the century.

Bottom line: we have largely offset the demographic deterioration of the last 15 years and its effect on the economy and inflation by increasing participation.

What does Australia need to do to address this? 

The Government needs to accept the reality that workers are an increasingly scarce resource in our economy and if we do not allow our workforce to adjust, if we do not encourage re-skilling, if we do not encourage business and other organisation to invest in labour saving technology, then we will continue to see our living standards go backwards as productivity erodes. 

We need to allow people to move to the most important jobs. Essentially, we need to have a more flexible labour market, but we also need government to play a role in making this process easier for everyone, most importantly workers but also business. We need to make changing jobs and reskilling a much more seamless and less distressing process that what has been in the past. But their IR agenda of the last three years has gone in the opposite direction.

Why can’t immigration solve this problem? 

At first glance you would think immigration and bringing in labour and skills would be a big part of the solution to this problem. It helps but it is no ‘silver bullet’.

Why? If a firm needs a particular skill set, let’s say an electrician, and can’t find anyone in Australia. Lets say the particular firm identifies a person in NZ, and finds a suitable Visa program to allow that person to emigrate here and work for the firm. The firm has solved their labour shortage. But the economy has not solved its problem because the worker from NZ brings in demand with them. They need housing, roads, hospitals etc. The overall economic imbalance between supply and demand is not solved. It helps, but only at the margin, and as we have seen with the immigration surge, rapid immigration brings with it major issues around housing, health etc. 

What about the role of technology in solving this, things like quantum computing and AI?

This is the good news. Rather than being some threat to our society or way of life, these new digital technologies are here to ‘save the day’. Unlike the experience of the 1990s, when we started to see a big reduction in our manufacturing sector, the loss of jobs back then was at a time of labour abundance; we were struggling to find jobs for new workers let alone jobs for structurally displaced workers in manufacturing. Haunting statistic: half the men over the age of 45years old that lost their job in manufacturing in early 1990s, never worked again.

This is a terrible outcome. And this is the type of experience that is colouring some peoples view of AI. But the world has changed. We need all hands-on deck. AI will displace jobs; this time it is likely to be a wave of female workers in the services sector. But we cannot afford to lose those workers from the workforce; they need to be re-training and skilled for the human centred jobs that computers and drones and bots can’t do.

Many people are coming at the AI problem all the wrong way: they are worried about job losses like we saw with manufacturing in the early 1990s. But the critical context is that we have structural labour shortages. And this is an example where we need a consensus from the Roundtable. And an example of how the Treasurer needs to stand up to certain groups, not least the union ,movement, that is failing to see this perspective and getting in the way of getting the right solution. Ideally, we would see the emergence of leaders in the union movement that understand these new realities and ‘manage to’ them, rather than ignore or deny the realities and seek other pathways for economic policy. 

We need to swim with the tide, not against it. This is a prime example; although not the only one of why a consensus around the ‘problem’ is so important.

We have a labour force that’s in relative decline compared to the size of the economy, where are we heading? 

If we cannot get that consensus on the nature of our productivity problem then we are on a long run path that looks like the RBA’s latest set of forecasts, probably worse. It is an economic path not too dissimilar to Japan over the last 25 years; a pathway characterised by government dominance, massive government budget deficits and massive government debt. Japan’s government is in real trouble. We have total government debt (state and federal) of around 40-50% of GDP; low by international standards. The Us and Europeans are very worried with government debts around 100% to 125% of GDP. Japan has government debt of 250% of GDP. The emergence of inflation in Japan is pushing up interest rates for the first time in 30 years. Long term interest rates have pushed above 3% for the first time in more than 40 years over the past three months. Japan is the proverbial canary in the coalmine on these demographic shifts and how to manage the economy.

But we look like we are in the early stages of taking the ‘Japan route’. Government spending is surging, masked in terms of budget position but a massive increase in income taxes via bracket creep. But we are now in deficit, and it does not look good. The government programs put in place in the past three years are increasingly expensive and will put more pressure on government finances and we will see a desire for higher taxation and of course, higher budget deficits.

The Australian economy is very different to Japan’s. We have the highest household debt in the world thanks to some of the most unaffordable housing in the world. We push too hard on government borrowing and there will be pressure brought to bear on the housing markets and household finances. Much more than what we have seen over the last three years. Our economy will not cope. The massive taxation of the tobacco market in the past 3 years is a salient warning about the effects of high taxation. It is an illusion. All they have done is created one of the biggest new sources of funding for organised crime in history. And reduced the tax take, putting more pressure on income taxes to fund the growing public spending in our society.

You have said that Australia is not well positioned for this new demographic reality with one of the lowest rates of job mobility in the world, why? And what do we need to do to fix this?

If we want to allow our society and economy to adjust to new realities, a big part of this is a reordering of the labour market. AI will touch most jobs and could maker up to 30% of roles redundant over the next 20 years. Rather than resist and regulate, we need to work out ways to encourage firms and workers to adjust. This implies a big pick up in job mobility, at odds with the long-term trend for declining job mobility, which is right on record lows. Australia has a particularly immobile labour force compared to other nations. We are not well placed to confront these new realities.

At what point do we drop the political footballing around our economic challenges and start leading people through difficult change? And how crucial is this?

It is the old story: do we get ahead of the problem, and start making the necessary adjustments, or do we wait for an economic catastrophe to provide the wake up call? We are already seeing the consequences of an immobile workforce showing up in the economy. We are already seeing the impact of big government spending on the economy. The lights are flashing amber. It takes incredible political courage and skill to undertake genuine reform. I am not that confident given the disposition of the current government.

It looks like we risk heading down the Japan route. Japan has been treading water for 30 years, but the recent rise of inflation and interest rates could be the start of some big adjustments in that economy.

I very much doubt that Australia can use government deficit spending to paper over our problems for the next 30 years. It would put too much pressure on our existing economic and financial structures. Structures that formed up over a period of high productivity and real income growth. Financial structures like high household debt will not stand up to a persistent decline in real incomes. Reality will catch up with us pretty quickly. Whether that be another inflation surge that drives interest rates higher or a default cycle that disrupts the banking system; I am not convinced we can remain in this government dominated economy for too much longer. Maybe another 5 years; could be a bit longer. Certainly not 30 years.

At what point do we admit that our economy is not adjusting to the realities of the world? And what are some of those realities?

As a community we are too focused on the ageing issue being about service provision to older Australians. We have been too dependent on government directed outcomes such as the child and age care policies of the last 3 years. We are not focused enough on economic functioning and dynamism. We can see the problems in Japan, parts of Europe. The political challenge might prove too great, however. 

We are seeing how a flexible private sector led economy is benefitting from new technology in the case of the US. US productivity is surging ahead of other advanced nations. They are creating an even bigger and more resilient economy through technological absorption. We are only at the start of this technological journey. 

Whether it be labour market reform, more disciplined government spending or policies that support and encourage the new digital capabilities, we are at risk of falling behind the ‘technological frontier’. 

I think we are already admitting it to some extent. The issue is whether we can act decisively to make the required policy adjustments that will allow the economy and all those in it to harness and apply new technology to our everyday lives.