Inflation Risks and Monetary Policy
There is a genuine risk that inflation could begin to rise again. This would suggest the decline in measured inflation over the past two years has only been a cyclical pause, rather than a return to the sustained price stability that characterised nearly thirty years before the pandemic.
This week’s quarterly Consumer Price Index (CPI) outcome serves as a timely warning for both markets and policymakers, highlighting that Australia’s inflation issue is far from resolved. Inflation has ceased its downward trend and now appears to be heady back above the Reserve Bank of Australia’s (RBA) 2–3 percent target range.
In truth, these results could underscore the significant risk that inflation may be on the rise again. As government energy subsidies unwind over the months ahead, headline inflation could rise to 4%.
This would indicate that the recent reduction in measured inflation over the past two years is a temporary pause in the inflation process as opposed to a restoration of price stability in the Australian economy (inflation under 3%).
Australia’s Vulnerability to Inflation
Australia’s household sector is among the most indebted in the world, with the majority of that debt held at floating interest rates. This precarious situation leaves little margin for error in the management of inflation. If inflation is allowed to accelerate, there is a real danger of a surge in interest rates, which could inflict serious harm on the financial health of households, governments, and financial institutions. The result would almost certainly be a recession—potentially escalating into a full-blown financial crisis. This would not be ‘the recession Australia had to have’, but ‘the recession that could have been avoided’.
The absence of strong economic leadership is evident, with a persistent focus on short-term political considerations taking precedence over long-term economic stability. Our professional economic policymakers have not stood up to the challenge, often failing to push back on those driven by fear and self-interest, which further undermines Australia’s policy environment.
The Phillips Curve: A Classic Tension
These events spotlight the longstanding macroeconomic challenge of balancing inflation and unemployment, often conceptualised as the Phillips curve. This is embodied in the RBA’s ‘dual Mandate’ to keep inflation low and stable while maximising employment.
This tension is not merely technical; it embodies a broader ideological debate. On one side, progressive voices emphasise the importance of employment, advocating for policies that prioritise job creation and protection. On the other, conservative perspectives stress the need to contain inflation, highlighting its risks to economic stability and purchasing power.
Decision Time for the RBA
Ultimately, the Reserve Bank of Australia could face some tough decisions over the year ahead.
The RBA now faces a difficult situation, with markets perceiving it as more responsive to rising unemployment than committed to containing inflation. This perception threatens the RBA’s inflation-fighting credibility. If that credibility erodes, the bank may be forced to implement more rate hikes than otherwise to address any resurgence of inflation.
Such a demonstration of resolve may be necessary from the RBA Governor in the coming week, given the market’s strong reaction to the recent and unexpected rise in the unemployment rate for September, as reported by the ABS.
The unemployment rate increased from 4.2% in August to 4.5% in September, surpassing the RBA’s forecast for the rate to remain at 4.3% over the coming year.
However, it is well understood that the monthly labour force report is volatile, with considerable potential for ‘noise’ in any given month. While the data confirms an upward drift in unemployment during 2025, the magnitude of the September rise may not accurately reflect the actual trends.
Therefore, it is prudent to await the next monthly employment report before drawing firm conclusions about the direction of the Australian labour market. The October report, to be released a few weeks but after the next RBA monetary policy board meeting, will be particularly significant.
Sound practice dictates that the RBA should reserve judgement until this further data is available.
There are both statistical and economic reasons to exercise caution in overinterpreting the recent unemployment numbers. The current rise in unemployment does not necessarily indicate weak demand for labour; rather, it reflects a mismatch between the skills that Australian workers possess and those that employers require.
Geographic immobility may also play a role, with new jobs being created in areas where unemployed workers are not present. This type of unemployment is structural in nature, not a symptom of weak aggregate demand. The RBA is unable to address this form of unemployment through monetary policy, and any attempt to do so risks fuelling inflation and introducing instability into the economy.
If Australia is indeed experiencing a structural shift in the demand for skills and their geographic distribution, the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU), will rise. For example, if the NAIRU was previously estimated at 4%, it could temporarily move higher, possibly towards 5%.
Political realities complicate the situation further. Explaining such structural shifts and the implications for full employment to politicians focused on re-election and maintaining strong tax revenue is a significant challenge and can lead to pressure on the RBA’s leadership.
The RBA Governor will need to firmly demonstrate inflation-fighting resolve.
medium to long term.
Historical Context and Lessons
Australia is entering a risky new phase in efforts to restore price stability, reminiscent of the mid-1970s. Then, an initial cyclical reprieve in inflation gave way to another destructive price surge. While modern experience with inflation in Australia is limited, eradicating entrenched inflation generally requires at least one recession—sometimes two, as seen in the United States under Paul Volcker, who restored price stability through recessions in 1979 and 1982. In Australia, a severe downturn in the early 1980s failed to fully eliminate inflation, which persisted until the financial crisis of 1991, resulting in accelerated structural change and lasting impacts on the labour market.
It is preferable to endure a period of subpar growth driven by industrial structural change than to suffer through repeated severe downturns, which can erode risk appetite, damage expectations, and diminish the credibility of Australian policymakers for years to come.
Conclusion
The RBA’s credibility remains fragile, both among financial markets and the broader community. It is crucial not to overinterpret recent unemployment figures while underestimating the persistence and risks of inflation.
